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CONSTITUTIONALIZING CHEVRON:
FILLING UP ON . INTERPRETIVE EQUALITY
Abstract This Note proposes a new approach to constitutional
interpretation, arguing that application of the Chevron doctrine to
constitutional interpretation is a logical outgrowth of Supreme Court
decisions and could harmonize some tensions in the Court's current
doctrines. This proposal would give Congress an explicit role in
interpreting the Constitution, while the Court retains its role as
supreme interpreter. Additionally, this Note suggests how this method
can be used to critique current Court decisions while putting aside the
agenda of individual commentators.
INTRODUCTION
As Alexis de Tocqueville noted in Democracy in America, "[t] here is
hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner
or later turn into a judicial one."' This observation has stood the test
of time, as the federal judiciary has been deeply enmeshed in the ma-
jor political issues facing the nation. 2 Sitting at the apex of this system,
the Supreme Court of the United States occupies a unique position.
Combining the power of judicial reviews with its status as the court of
last resort in the United States,4 the Court's decisions on constitu-
tional issues effectively bind an entire nation for the indefinite future
in a manner largely insulated from changing political tides. 5 Although
not immutable, these decisions are rarely altered through the adop-
t ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 ( IR Mayer ed., George Law-
rence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1838).
2 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding Congress could not use its
Commerce Clause power to abrogate state sovereign immunity); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 623 (1996) (invalidating amendment to Colorado constitution); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937) (upholding maximum hour and minimum wage
laws during Depression); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857) (sulk-
ing down Missouri Compromise).
SeeMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) ( Jackson, J., concurring) ("[Wie are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
5 The Court is insulated to the extent its members are appointed for life. See U.S.
CoNsT. art. III, § 1. At the same time, political forces shape the composition of the Court
because the appointments are made by the President of the United States with the advice
and consent of the Senate. See U.S. CONS?. art. 11, § 2.
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tion of constitutional amendments or the explicit overruling of prior
decisions.6
The Supreme Court (as well as the rest of the federal judiciary)
draws on a deep well of philosophical considerations, supplemented
with the tradition of stare decisis, to guide its decisions in concrete fac-
tual situations.? Against this backdrop of reasoned opinion stands the
raw reality that five votes, regardless of motivation, can dictate the
course of constitutional development or discard the decisions of the
past. 8
 These institutional characteristics, combined with the Court's
unique visibility, make the Court a focus of constitutional theorists. 9
Given the Court's own statements about its proper role—contrasting
the judicial function against a presumptively illegitimate political
role—there has been an understandable and important focus on
formulating standards to evaluate judicial decisions."
Over the years, a distinguished group of theorists have added
their voices to this dialogue over the proper method(s) for interpret-
ing the Constitution." Many of these interpretive theories depend
upon a broader theory of the Constitution, which creates a unified
constitutional/interpretive theory." One hallmark of traditional con-
stitutional theory has been an emphasis on deriving a particular, "cor-
6
 For instance, the Court handed down eighty decisions in 1996 alone. See EDWARD
LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 30 (1999). Against this number, extended over two centuries,
stand the seventeen Constitutional amendments passed since the initial adoption of the
Bill of Rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI—XXVII. Further supporting this institutional view
of slow change is the realization that a Court can be characterized as "activist" after over-
ruling six precedents in a recent year. See Robert H. Bork et al., Symposium: Do We Have a
Conservative Supreme Court?, 1994 Pun. INT, L. REP. 125, 132 (1994).
7 Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J., opinion), with id.
at 398 (Iredell, J., opinion) (debate between Justices Chase and Iredell on proper role of
natural law in Supreme Court adjudication).
8 See LAZARUS, supra note 6, at 277 ("[Justicej Brennan was famous for holding up one
of his hands, wiggling his fingers and reminding colleagues of the all-important rule of
five.").
9
 For examples, see generally, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998); ROBERT IL BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SE-
DUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985).
10
 Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1997) (rejecting interpretive
role for Congress) with id. at 536 (recognizing judicial role as different than congressional
political role).
" See supra note 9 for a small sample of authors.
12
 See, e.g., MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 1-196 (John H. Garvey & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff eds., 3d ed. 1994) (providing overview of significant interpretive and
constitutional theories).
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rect" interpretive methodology," thus leading to a host of competing
methodologies with widely divergent results; results which often ap-
pear tied to the political movements of the day. 14 This interrelation-
ship between methodology and results drives much of the current
theorizing in the constitutional field. 15 Scholars attempt to justify the
Court's "good" opinions, while finding ways to delegitimize or lessen
the impact of the Court's "bad" decisions, all with an eye towards
influencing the future." Despite all this effort no single theorist or
theory has achieved a consensus among academics or been adopted
by a majority of the Supreme Court. 17 Recently, however, constitu-
tional theorists have begun looking beyond these unitary theories and
have explored pluralist visions of the Constitution."
Pluralist theorists accept as a given the range of disagreetnent
between advocates of the competing unitary theories. 19 They also ac-
cept that this variety in constitutional theory translates into a plurality
of methods for interpreting the Constitution." Rather than picking
one method over another, these theorists explore the interrelation-
ship between these methods. 21 This exploration is both descriptive,
focusing on judicial action, and normative, focusing on the
justifications for certain methodological choices. 22 Granted that there
' 3 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 239-40 (implying that Hercules, the ideal judge,
reaches "the answers I now think best.").
14 Seegenerally SCOTT ARMSTRONG & BOB WOODWARD, BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1981); LAZARUS, Supra note 6.
16 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 9; BORK, SUpra note 9.
IS See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term: Foreword: The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 4, 61 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1993 Term:
Foreword: Leaving Things Unsaid, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62-77 {1996); see also PHILLIP Bon-
Brrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 178 (1991) ("The efforts of many thinkers ...
typically consist in trying to impose a meta-rule to resolve the indeterminacy ... along
lines of which the critic approves."); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITU-
TION, at xiii (1987) (observing that methodology debates are really about substance);
BORK, supra note 9, at 202 {critiquing Professor Tribe for continually finding new method-
ologies to defend Roe v. 1Thde)
17 See Stephen M. Griffin, Symposium on Philip Bobbin's Constitutional Interpretation: Plural-
ism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72'1x. L. REV. 1753, 1757-62 (1994).
18 See, e.g., Borurr, supra note 16, at 8-10; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coher-
ence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1192 (1987); Robert Post,
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 113, 18-19 (1990).
19 See, e.g., Boanirr, supra note 16, at xiii (evaluating interpretive disagreements be-
tween ideologues).
" See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 17, at 1762-63 (summarizing three lines of pluralistic
thought).
31 See id. at 1763-65 (listing recognized sources of value and summarizing how Post,
Fallon and Bobbitt address the relationships between these sources).
22 See id. at 1768 (explaining descriptive and normative elements in pluralistic theory).
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is wide pluralism in the United States, with its attendant disagreement
over policy as well as what qualifies as legitimate constitutional or in-
terpretive theory, it becomes ever more important to find a way to de-
lineate the proper role of the Court. Ideally, the contours of such a
theory should be divorced from any single policy outlook, and yet
lead to concrete results.
This Note will explore the ramifications of pluralism as it applies
to the Supreme Court's power to interpret the Constitution through
judicial review of federal statutes. Part I will explore current theoreti-
cal and methodological approaches to constitutional interpretation
while examining some of the central cases surrounding the practice
of judicial review. 23
 In light of the Court's holding in Chevron USA, Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which dealt with the Court's power
of statutory interpretation, the time has come to adopt a method of
interpretation that accords Congress an important role in interpret-
ing the often ambiguous phrases of the Constitution. 24 Part II will set
forth the basic rationale for that new constitutional interpretive
methodology.25
 This proposed methodology avoids unfettered judi-
cial or congressional interpretive supremacy by establishing a para-
digm of principled interpretive equality between the branches.26 It
offers Congress an explicit role in interpreting the Constitution, while
still reserving the ultimate interpretive role for the Supreme Court.
Part III applies the methodology to two prominent Supreme Court
cases, Roe v. Wade 27
 and City of Boerne v. Flores. 28
 Finally, Part IV will ex-
amine some of the reasons supporting the proposed methodology
and some possible counter-arguments against such a proposal. 29 This
Note will argue that not only would such a system fit comfortably
within the Court's precedents, but it should also improve the state of
the law and the decision-making process on the Supreme Court. Even
if the concrete proposals within this Note are rejected, this methodol-
ogy may still serve as a positive framework for constitutional discus-
23 See infra notes 30-112 and accompanying text.
24 See 467 U.S. 837,866 (1984). There is almost universal accord that at least some, if
not all, of the Constitution consists of ambiguity. See, e.g., ARIEL REED AMAR & ALAN
HIRSCH, •OR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT Mutt RIGIITS, at
xxi (1998); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 135.
25 See infra notes 113-153 and accompanying text.
25 Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864-65 (discussing proper role of judges, distinct from
"judges' personal policy preferences").
27 410 U.S. at 113.
" 521 U.S. at 507. See infra notes 154-220 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 221-308 and accompanying text.
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sion, thereby improving the dialogue outside the courts concerning
the document that governs all our lives.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW: DECIDING WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS
One of the hallmarks of American constitutional analysis is the
conceptual divide between the wisdom of a statute and its constitu-
tionality." This feature has been described as a distinction between
first-order justifications, which refer to a statute's wisdom, and second-
order justifications, which refer to a statute's constitutionality." Be-
cause the Constitution refers to itself as "the supreme Law,"32 at first
glance it would appear that its supremacy should remove any need to
invoke first-order questions in any discussion of constitutional inter-
pretive methodology. 33 This is complicated, however, by the near-
universal acknowledgment of ambiguity in the Constitution's textual
provisions."
Regardless of where interpretive power is lodged," in order to
arrive at concrete decisions, interpretive tools must be used to divine
meaning out of the Constitution's ambiguities." In the context of
statutory interpretation, a variety of tools, called "canons of construc-
tion," have been developed to address these problems." A similar
situation exists with regard to constitutional interpretation, but there
is considerable disagreement in the Court and among commentators
over which tools are proper and how they should be used. 38
" See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 729,732 (1992).
31 See id. at 732-33.
32 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
33 Because the Constitution is "supreme" its "law" would appear to transcend our con-
cepts of "good" and "bad." Although an argument might be made that the Preamble rein-
corporates these distinctions, it suffices for present purposes to note that, at face value, the
Supremacy Clause appears to foreclose any appeal to extraneous value judgments. Cf. U.S.
CONST. pmbl.
" See supra note 24.
35 For present purposes, only Congress and the Supreme Court will be considered.
Congress has not directly asserted interpretive power over the entire Constitution. See PAUL
R. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT & JUDICIAL CHOICE: THE ROLE OF PROVISIONAL REVIEW
IN A DEMOCRACY 103 n.1 (1989).
36 See, e.g., DOBBITT, supra note 16, at x—xi.
" Some examples include canons stating that in construction, absurdity should be
avoided, and that usually the natural meaning is used rather than any technical meaning
in construing a word. A rather exhaustive list of canons can be found in CHESTER JAMES
ANTIEU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION. at ix—xi (1982).
38 See Griffin, supra note 17, at 1755-57.
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In order to justify one ordering system over another, commenta-
tors often employ meta-theories of political legitimacy or general legal
theory.59 They then apply these combined constitutional/interpretive
theories to cases, arguing for the "correct" outcome.40 These grander
theories can be roughly broken down into process-based or rights-
based theories.41
 Process-based theories focus less on particular results
and more on the process of arriving at those results. 42 Rights-based
theories, on the other hand, can be characterized by their adherence
to a particular substantive vision of the Constitution and its protec-
tions.° Even a purportedly process-based theory such as John Hart
Ely's representation-reinforcing role of the Court has been subject to
criticism over the substantive choices and commitments it requires."
Not only does the disagreement between proponents of the various
theories appear intractable, there is often an underlying sense that
much of this theorizing is, to some extent, results-driven. 45 As a matter
of persuasiveness, this "preaching to the choir" element of such theo-
rizing appears unlikely to change the minds of opponents and has
been criticized as a danger to scholarly values. 46 These shortcomings
in unitary theories have led to recent explorations into pluralistic
theories of constitutional interpretation, which accept as a given the
diversity of viewpoints and interpretive tools that the legal community
currently possesses.47
39 See, e.g., David Lyons, Substance, Process and Outcome in Constitutional Theory, 72 COR-
NELL L. REV. 745, 760 (1987); Alan Hunt, Law's Empire or Legal Imperialism, in READING
DWORKIN CRITICALLY 9, 29 (Alan Hunt ed., 1992) (discussing attempt to ground legal
theory within theory of interpretation); Cass R. Sun stein, Must Formalism be Defended Empiri-
cally?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 664-65 (1999) (discussing Easterbrook and theories of po-
litical legitimacy as precursor to formalism).
4° See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 379-92 (Hercules applying law to Supreme Court
cases).
41 See GARVEY & ALEINIKOFF, supra note 12, at 2.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Theories, 89 YALE U.
1063, 1065-77 (1980); see also GARVEY & ALEINIKOFF, supra note 12, at 2.
43 See John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World
Where Courts are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 853-54 (1991) (criticizing
doctrinaire trend in academic analysis).
49 See Griffin, supra note 17, at 1767.
47
 See BOBBITT, supra note 16, at 28-30.
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A. Plutalism: A Brief Sketch of the Multiplicity of Legitimacy
Professors Babbitt, Post and Fallon have all put forward plural-
istic theories of interpretation." While Fallon assumes this plural-
isni,49 Bobbitt traces the source to the common law with its use of
multiple tools," and Post looks to the different theories stemming
from different conceptions of constitutional authority represented by
the process-centered and rights-centered theories mentioned previ-
ously." What each of these theories shares is an acceptance of diverse
interpretive tools, each with a claim to legitimacy.52 At least on a de-
scriptive level, this appears to be the most accurate picture of the Su-
preme Court, where multiple interpretive methods are used and
where there has been no ranking of the methods." All of these
authors agree that using this variety of methods will inevitably lead to
situations where conflicting answers can be justified." For Babbitt,
this situation allows for the exercise of conscience in decision-
making,55 while Post describes it as the exercise of legal judgment. 56
Fallon, on the other hand, proposes a hierarchy of methods, 57 evoking
Rawls' lexical hierarchy in A Theory of Justice.58 These pluralistic theo-
ries place the Supreme Court's explication of its own interpretive
powers in an important context, particularly when dealing with con-
gressional enactments and their relation to the Constitution.
B. The Supreme Court's View of Its Interpretive Powers
The Supreme Court has maintained the power to declare acts of
Congress unconstitutional since MarIntry 1). Madison, decided in
1803.59 The rationale for the decision was based on the Court's insti-
45 See generally id.; Fallon, supra note 18; Post, supra note 18.
45 See Fallon, supra note 18, at 1189-90.
° SeeBOBBITT, supra note 16, at 5.
m See Post, supra note 18, at 19-26.
55 See Griffin, supra note 17, at 1763-64.
55 See id. at 1757.
54 See id. at 1764-66 (summarizing views of Fallon, Bobbitt and Post regarding the pos-
sibility of conflicting answers).
55 See Roam-iv, supra note 16, at 168.
50 See Post, supra note 18, at 35.
57 See Fallon, supra note 18, at 1193-94.
55 Compare Fallon, supra note 18, at 1193-94, with jonN RAwl.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
92-43 (1971) (describing lexical ordering as placing principles in serial order, where the
first must be satisfied belbre moving on to the second, third and so forth).
59 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 173, 179 (1803).
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tutional capacity to interpret the language of the Constitution. 60 At
the same time, the Supreme Court has never explicitly acknowledged
a similar wide-ranging power in Congress to interpret the Constitu-
tion.61
 It has, however, recognized a doctrine of "political questions"
whereby the Court declares certain issues non-justiciable clue to the
Constitution's commitment of interpretive power solely to another
branch.62
Marbury stands as the first instance in which the Supreme Court
refused to enforce a federal statute on the basis of the statute's un-
constitutionality. 63
 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court
based the inability of the Court to effect a writ of mandamus for Mar-
bury on several arguments. First, he relied on the fact that the United
States Constitution is written.64
 As a corollary to this, Marshall invoked
the role of the judiciary to say what the law is—relying on historical
judicial practices when interpreting a statute or facing conflicting
statutes. 65
 Once the power of the judiciary to look to the Constitution
and interpret it was affirmed, Marshall also pointed to the oath that
judges must take as support for review. 66
 Finally, he pointed to the
Constitution's own statement that it is the supreme law of the land as
support for holding void a law repugnant to the Constitution.° Thus,
the judicial veto over congressional legislation was born.
This veto power went unexercised by the Supreme Court for al-
most sixty years before being invoked in the case of Dred Scott v.
Sanford in 1857.68
 Between 1865 and 1986, the Supreme Court de-
clared another 108 acts of Congress unconstitutional. 69 It was within
the context of a challenge to the Court's invalidation of state action,
however, that the Court first explicitly asserted that it had the ultimate
power to interpret the Constitution." In the 1958 decision, Cooper v.
Aaron, a unanimous Court held that a local school district could not
60
 See id. at 175-76.
61 See DIMOND, supra note 35, at 103 n.l.
62 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226-28 (1993); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 209-37 (1962).
63
 See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES 32-33 (9th ed. 1990).
64 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-79.
65 See id. at 177.
66 See id. at 180.
67 See id.
68 See 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1856); see also MASON 8c STEPHENSON, supra note 63,
at 35 thl. 2.1.
69 See MASON & STEPHENSON, supra note 63, at 35 tbl. 2.1.
70
 See infra note 71-74 and accompanying text.
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postpone its desegregation plan after the state's governor created a
situation so flammable that the President federalized the National
Guard to preserve order.71 One of the governor's and the state legisla-
ture's stated rationales for their actions opposing the Court's original
desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education," was their belief
that the decision was unconstitutional." In response to this direct
challenge to the Court and to public order, the Court underscored its
constitutional superiority over state actors by referring to Marbury as
declaring the "basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution." 74 Thus, although the
Court conceded that the school district's officials were making good
faith efforts to comply with the order, the district could not use the
actions of other state actors to justify further delay in the enforcement
of the desegregation order.
This doctrine of supreme interpretive power was occasionally sof-
tened by the Court's invocation of a "political questions" doctrine,
whereby the Court pronounced certain issues not amenable to judi-
cial resolution." The Court explored the intersection of these two
doctrines in the 1962 decision, Baker Y. Carr, where the Court held the
Tennessee legislature's failure to reapportion voter districts abridged
the right to vote." The Court rejected an argument that the judiciary
could not consider the case under the "political question" doctrine. 77
This self-imposed doctrine claims to resolve adequately an issue or
that the issue has been textually committed to another branch of gov-
ernment." Under either line of reasoning, the effect of the political
question doctrine is to leave certain areas untouched by the Court's
jurisprudence, and to look instead to other politically accountable
branches for redress." The Court explored the prior political ques-
tion precedents and concluded that the current case did not fit into
any of these earlier situations." Iri so doing, the Court reiterated its
n See 358 U.S. 1, 4-11 (1958).
72 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73 See Cooper 358 U.S. at 4.
74 Id. at 18.
75 See infra note 76-90 and accompanying text.
76 See 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
77 See id. at 209-37.
See id. at 210-11.
79 See, e.g., id. at 223-25 (detailing judicial refusal to enter into political question
cases); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46 (1849) (holding question of which gov-
ernment of Rhode Island was legitimate government was a political question for Congress,
not amenable to judicial resolution).
8° See 369 U.S. at 209-37.
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status as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, but also relied to
some extent on the fact that this case involved a state, rather than a
co-equal branch of the federal governments'
Left unanswered was the question how these "ultimate inter-
preter" and "political question" doctrines would interact with con-
gressional action. In the 1969 case of Powell v. McCormack, the Court
applied the "ultimate interpreter" formulation to congressional action
in concluding that the exclusion of an elected representative from
Congress was unconstitutional. 82 The Court rejected a congressional
assertion that its action was unreviewable as an exercise of congres-
sional power to determine, under Article I, § 5 of the Constitution,
whether elected members met the qualifications necessary to serve in
Congress." Although both sides presented interpretations of the un-
derlying language and although the proposed congressional interpre-
tation might have met the Court's political question test, the Court
found the excluded member's argument conclusive.s 4 In its eight to
one decision, the Court held that the representative was unconstitu-
tionally excluded from his seat in the 90th Congress—the single dis-
sent preferring to rest on mootness grounds rather than the major-
ity's rationale."
In 1993, the Court again dealt with the "political question" doc-
trine when faced with another challenge to congressional action, this
time in the impeachment arena.86 In Nixon u United States, a federal
district judge attempted to challenge the legality of his impeachment
by Congress." The judge argued that the Senate failed to "try" him
under the Impeachtnent Clause of the Constitution. 88 The Court held
that the case was a non-justiciable political question because the in-
terpretation of the word "try" was committed "solely" to the Senate by
the Constitution." By invoking the "political question" doctrine and
its attendant concerns with affording the other branches of govern-
ment due respect, the majority essentially declared the impeachment
process outside the jurisdiction of the Court."
81 See id. at 211, 226.
82 See 395 U.S. 486, 989, 521 (1969).
83 See id. at 548.
" See id. at 519-548.
85 See id. at 550; see also id. at 559 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
88 See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.




99 See id. at 228-29.
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In 1994, the year after Nixon was decided, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act ("RFRA") in an attempt to
overrule the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause decision in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith, handed down during the Court's 1992
term.91 In Smith, a 6-3 decision upheld the application of a statute
depriving a member of the Native American Church unemployment
benefits following his dismissal for peyote use. 92 Congress, which had
previously allowed recognition of peyote use within its regulatory
framework, disapproved of the decision." Purportedly drawing upon
its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed
RFRA.94 The purpose of the law was to enforce a congressional view of
the protections to be found in the First Amendment, which in this
case meant requiring the government to advance a compelling inter-
est before it could regulate a religious believer's conduct. 95
The Supreme Court invalidated this legislation in City of Boerne v.
Flores, decided in 1997.96 Although conceding the power of Congress
to enact rules to prevent violations of the First Amendment by the
states, the Court noted that, in this case, there was no "congruence
between the means used and the ends to be achieved."97 The Court
found no evidence before itself or Congress indicating passage of
generally applicable laws because of religious bigotry." Significantly,
the Court discussed the extent of congressional power to "enforce"
the Fourteenth Amendment in terms of interpretive power."
The Court acknowledged that "the line between measures that
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern," 100 and
that "Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it
lies."1 °1 At the same time, the Court explicitly denied that Congress
91 See 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also City of Boerne v Flores, 521 U.S. 507,512-15 (1997)
(describing Congressional motivation).
92 See id. at 873-74.
99 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515; Eric E. Sterling, Drug Policy: A Smorgasbord of Co-
nundrum Spiced by Emotions Around Children & Violence, 31 VAL. U. L. REA'. 597,605 (1997)
(citing federal regulation protecting peyote use).
94 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516.
95 See id. at 515-16.
06 See id. at 512.
07 Id. at 530; see also id. at 518-20.
98 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32.
99 See id. at 527-29.
100 Id: at 519.
101 Id. at 520.
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had any substantive power under the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Ac-
cording to the Court, "[i]f Congress could define its own powers by
altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the
Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means."'103
 Thus, in striking down RFRA and rejecting this interpre-
tive argument, the Court noted that, "[u] nder [the congressional]
approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit
congressional power. "1°4
In the context of statutory interpretation, however, the Court
took a very different stance in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, decided in 1984. 105
 In that case the Court unanimously
delineated the respective interpretive roles of executive agencies and
the courts when dealing with federal statutes.'" In reversing a lower
court's interpretation of an environmental statute, the Court estab-
lished a two-step test for determining when to give deference to
agency interpretations. 107
 First, the Court required a finding by the
judiciary that the statutory language involved was ambiguous.'" If a
statute was not ambiguous, the agency would not be entitled to defer-
ence—the courts would substitute this "clear" meaning of the statute
for the agency's interpretation.'" Once a finding of ambiguity was
made, however, the Court then asked whether the agency interpreta-
tion was reasonable.m In upholding the EPA's interpretation as rea-
sonable, the Court focused not just on the ambiguity of the statutory
language, but also on the essentially political nature of the choice be-
tween one interpretation over another interpretation when a statute
could support both. 111
102
 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
103 Id. at 529.
104 Id.
105
 467 U.S. 837,837 (1984).
106 See id. at 839.
107
 See id. at 842-43.
108
 See id. at 842.
100 See id. at 842-43.
110
 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
111 See id. at 844-45,864-66.
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II. STRIKING OIL: APPLYING CHEVRON TO CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
A. The Basic Argument
Chevron provides the principle for regulating congressional inter-
pretation that was missing in Boerne. The Court in Boerne read the
congressional assertion of interpretive power as a direct challenge to
its own authority, and as an assertion of the same legislative suprem-
acy that Congress has with respect to the federal judiciary's interpreta-
tions of statutory provisions. 112 In this realm of statutory interpreta-
tion, Congress has a basically unreviewable power to overturn
Supreme Court statutory constructions, subject only to constitutional
constraints.'" A more appropriate view of the power exercised in
RFRA, however, treats congressional interpretation of the Constitu-
tion as a parallel to agency interpretation of a statute. Just as the judi-
ciary retains an important but circumscribed role in channeling
agency interpretations, so too would the Court retain an important
role in channeling congressional interpretations.
The Court's own reasoning in Chevron leads the way to a principle
that adequately restrains both congressional and judicial power. Addi-
tionally, the framework that follows will reconcile the "unchanging"
text and law that is the Constitution, with the "evolutionary" needs
and realities of American society. This principle, applying the Chevron
framework to congressional interpretation of the Constitution, em-
bodies the central insight of Chevron: "When a challenge to an agency
construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really cen-
ters on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a
reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge
must fail." 114 The Court's decision hearkens back to the basic concern
between permissible judgment and impermissible will as exercised by
the judiciary that one finds in the writings of the Federalist Papers
112 See 521 U.S. 507, 515, 536 (1997).
m See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No, 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1994) (overturning several Supreme Court
decisions).
114 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Ress. Del Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (emphasis
added).
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and in Marshall's Marbury opinion—it is the heart of the "counter-
majoritarian problem."
The Chevron Court concluded that Congress implicitly grants
agencies interpretive power whenever a statute's terms are ambigu-
ous. 116 The role of courts, then, is to channel those interpretations to
make sure that they are reasonable, thereby limiting the courts' role
to ensuring that agency interpretations are consistent with the under-
lying statute. 117 Translated into terms of interpretive theory, the Court
in effect acknowledged the pluralist conception of values within the
realm of statutory interpretation by acknowledging the existence of
several possible "correct" interpretations of a single statute, so long as
they are "reason able."118
Significantly, the Court also accepted the "legal realist" critique
that, at least in those situations where legal tools do not lead to a deci-
sive outcome, the exercise of discretion in picking one interpretation
over another by a judge is truly a political choice. 119 Rather than
usurp the role of the politically responsive branches in this way, the
Court focused on ensuring that the agency interpretation was
justifiable)" One important side effect of this decision is the leeway
that it apparently gives agencies to shift their interpretation under a
statute that may be unchanging so long as these interpretive shifts
meet the "reasonableness" standard. 121 This allows agencies to re-
spond to changing times, circumstances and needs in a way that is
difficult, if not impossible, for courts to do. 122
115 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962)
(identifying counter-majoritarian problem).
1 ' 6 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
117 See id. at 865-66.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 866. The legal realist position held, in brief sketch, that on many questions
the law did not provide a single answer; that it was indeterminate. In these indeterminate
situations, more often than not it was subconscious biases or other processes that led to the
outcome and that it was important to openly confront this problem. For the reader who
does not want to read the collected works of Holmes and Brandeis or others associated
with the realism movement, see Ely, supra note 45, at 835 n.7 (Indeed, the very point of
early realists like Holmes and Brandeis was that judges should understand what they are
doing is not essentially different from legislating, and approach their jobs with appropriate
restraint.") (emphasis added).
120 See id. at 865-66.
121 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-65.
122 See generally Dorf, supra note 16 (arguing common law method not flexible enough
for modern pace of change.)
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Just as executive agencies and the judiciary stand subordinate to
a congressional enactment, so too .do Congress and the judiciary
stand subordinate to the Constitution. 123 Both Congress and executive
agencies are empowered to bring the abstract language of a written
document into a form where it may be implemented in everyday
situations. It is this identical relationship to a written text that argues
for recognizing an explicit congressional role in interpreting the Con-
stitution, a role parallel to that granted agency interpretations of fed-
eral statutes found in Chem:m. 124 The Constitution sterns from "We,
the People," through the mechanics of its adoption and subsequent
amendments.'25 Similar to congressional legislation, its language of-
ten reflects compromise or a tacit acceptance that difficulties, which
might not be worked out at the moment, can be left to another day in
the face of strong need. 126 Additionally, by its very nature it is meant
to adapt to changing circumstances.127
These features lead to the ambiguity one finds in so many of its
most ringing phrases, an ambiguity shared by federal statutes. 128 Equal
protection serves as a good example. 129 Does it mean formal equality
of opportunity or outcome? Both? Neither? The Court gives flesh to
concepts like equal protection through its interpretations, but these
interpretations are the result of choices.'" The Court acknowledges
this much and more, in recognizing both the greater need to revisit
its constitutional decisions and the greater likelihood of reversing its
123 Although this sentiment (and the ideology associated with it) can be linked to Ed-
win Meese, See Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL. DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 13 (2d ed. 1996), it really is a tautology based on the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art, VI.
124 Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (one judicial response to ambiguity), with City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527-29 (1997) (different response to ambiguity).
125 See U.S. CONST. art. VII (ratification process), art. V (amendment process).
120 See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 350
(1988) ("The Framers had a genius for studied imprecision and calculated ambiguity.
They relied on generalized terms ... because politics required compromise, and because corn-
protruse required ambiguity.") (emphasis added).
127 See id. at 294; see also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION
AS POLITICAL. PROCESS 229-30 (1988); ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGE & FUN-
DAMENTAL. LAW: AMERICA'S EVOLVING CoNsTrrurrioN 3 (1979).
I II Compare LEVI', MOM note 126, at 350 (discussing constitutional ambiguity) with
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (discussing statutory ambiguity).
122 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
1 " Compare Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873) (concluding Four-
teenth Amendment not intended to fundamentally alter relationship between federal gov-
ernment and states) with Am" supra note 9, at 163-71 (arguing for more expansive view
of Fourteenth Amendment based upon historical materials).
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constitutional precedents."' Unless one maintains that this evolution-
ary process on the Court is completely divorced from the realities of
our society, the importance of understanding society's current needs
should be clear.'" Congressional representatives are institutionally
better suited to understanding and adapting to these needs because
of their responsiveness to the electorate.'"
Coupled with statutory and constitutional ambiguity is the ac-
countability shared by Congress and to a lesser extent, agencies, fur-
ther suggesting the shared benefits of congressional and agency in-
terpretive power. In the same sense that Congress oversees the
agencies it creates, thus reducing the need for judicial decision as to
the best policy among reasonable alternatives, so too do the American
people watch over their elected representatives. 134
 In Marbury, Mar-
shall essentially accepted Chevron's basic division between reasonable
and unreasonable alternatives in evaluating the actions of executive
officers, and the argument seems equally applicable to congressional
actors, who are bound by the same oath as executives and the judici-
ary."5
 Additionally, Marshall put particular stress in Marbury on the
Constitution's written nature as a justification for judicial review.'"
See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,235 (1997) ("As we have often noted, 'stare
decisis is not an inexorable command,' but instead reflects a policy judgment ... That pol-
icy is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be
altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.") (citations
omitted).
132
 As Oliver Wendell Hohnes observed: it is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." RESPECTFULLY QUOTED:
A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS REQUESTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.
192 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
133 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955):
[The] law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and
that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational
way to correct it.... For protection against abuses by legislatures the people
must resort to the polls, not to the courts"
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
134
 See generally Amaia & HIRSCH, Supra note 24 (arguing for overruling by plebiscite);
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING TIIE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (arguing that
demise of judicial review would not be problematic because of democratic participation).
Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 (focusing on agency responsiveness, even though agency
members are not elected).
135 Cf. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170 ("The providence of the court is, solely, to de-
cide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion.").
136 See id. at 176-77.
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Insofar as the Supreme Court has consistently invoked the tools
of statutory construction to ascertain the meaning of ambiguous
phrases in the Constitution, the very foundations of judicial review
argue strongly for congruent application of basic statutory interpre-
tive principles to the Constitution as wel1. 137 Accepting this and
thereby allowing Congress to explicitly interpret the Constitution
does not necessarily lead to legislative supremacy, however. The Chev-
ron Court acknowledged an important, but circumscribed role in de-
termining what the law ultimately is—ensuring that debatable agency
interpretations are implemented only where the statute is ambiguous
and ensuring that these interpretations are themselves reasonable.'"
Accepting such a role with regard to constitutional interpretation
would thus also leave the Court's role as ultimate interpreter intact.
The question remains, then, how might such a process work?
B. Constitutional Interpretive Equality in Action
Applying the Chevron framework to congressional interpretations
of the Constitution, the basic approach of the Court in most instances
would be identical with current practice. It is an inescapable reality of
the judicial system that courts must make decisions in concrete
cases. 1 " Assuming no explicit guidance from Congress, individual
judges would continue to make what they feel is the best decision un-
der the circumstances. 140 In this sense, constitutional practice would
parallel that used whenever the Court approaches the application of a
statute in a given case. The primary differences between this pro-
posed methodology and current practice involves what happens when
Congress addresses the constitutional interpretive question before the
Court considers a challenge to a particular statute, and what Congress
may do once the Court strikes down a statute in the absence of a con-
gressional interpretation.
In the same way that agencies may adopt binding statutory inter-
pretations under Chevron, Congress could adopt a constitutional in-
terpretation and give it the effect of law, either as part of an enacted
statute or standing alone, before the Court has evaluated the statute's
constitutionality. These interpretations would need to explicitly state
197
	 id. at 173-76 (invoking tools of statutory construction); Griffin, supra note 17, at
1763-64 (discussing interpretive tools).
1$ See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
139 See, e.g., KARL LLEWVELLN, BRAMBLE BUSH 40 (1960).
140 See Griffin, supra note 17, at 1765 (describing current need to exercise legal judg-
ment).
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how Congress is construing the Constitution's demands, so that the
Court may adequately determine the compatibility of such interpreta-
tions with the Constitution. These interpretations would be binding
on the courts, and thus would have to meet Article I standards, in-
cluding the President's veto power, in order to achieve this effect."'
This requirement would also prevent Congress from opportunistically
passing legislation based on varying interpretations of the same clause
at the same time. Whatever flexibility the Constitution contains, its
singular text should have the same meaning for all at any one time. 142
When confronted with a question of constitutional interpretation in-
volving one of these areas, the Court would evaluate the proposed
construction under a slightly modified Chevron doctrine.
First, the Court would ask if the Constitution is clear on the point
at issue. 143
 At this point, the inquiry should center on employing the
traditional tools of legal analysis. If all of these tools point in the same
direction, the answer is clear. 144
 In essence, unanimity is the test at this
point. Any proposed interpretation that conflicted with a unanimous
answer would thus be rejected summarily. Why? The process-based
answer is that when the presumably diverse members of the Court,
employing whatever iteration of the various methodologies available
to them all come to the same answer, there is strong reason to believe
that the Court's exercise was one of "judgment," not of impermissible
"will . "145
If there are differences in the answers reached by the members of
the Court, however, the Court would then move on to the next ques-
tion: is the interpretation reasonable?146
 How the Court approaches
this question will depend upon the procedural posture of the case. If
the case is one of first impression for the Court, it will have to answer
this question with reference to the opinions of its members and the
other tools available to it. Assume, for instance, that Congress passes
a statute that includes a section saying the prohibition of unreason-
able searches and seizures has a "good faith" exception contained
within it. The Court would then ask whether that constructions was
reasonable before passing on the constitutionality of the effective ele-
141 g BoWsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,726-27 (1986).
142 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Grand') at 177 (unchanging text).
"3 Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (analogous principle).
144 See Griffin, supra note 17, at 1764-65 (arguing, implicitly, that when multiple meth-
ods do not conflict, legal answer is clear).
145
 Cf. FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
146 Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (asking same question in statutory context).
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ments of the statute. Just as easily, Congress could interpret a right to
education to fall within the Fourteenth Amendment's protections in
passing a law mandating equal educational opportunities in a state.
Again, the approach would be the same. Thus one can see the politi-
cal neutrality of the approach—without working through the analysis
it is unclear what the answer in any individual case would be, but the
process itself would be straightforward.
If, however, the case is brought in front of the Court in response
to congressional re-enactment of a statute previously rejected as un-
constitutional—assuming Congress has also passed a law detailing
how it construed the relevant constitutional phrases—the Court
would have the benefit of the majority, dissenting and concurring
opinions as further guideposts in determining reasonability. 147 The
Court even has a built-in baseline for determining unreasonableness
as a matter of law beyond purely intellectual arguments. As men-
tioned earlier, unanimous decisions, prior to the Court's recognition
of the reasonableness standard in this proposal, should foreclose con-
gressional reconsideration because they represent a decision that the
meaning of some phrase was sufficiently clear. Likewise, unanimous
decisions under the first arm of the modified Chevron test would do
the same. Again, the , convergence of views provides unique reassur-
ance that a decision is well-grounded or "clear" in the parlance of
Chevron. Under either scenario, whether the Court addresses a case of
first impression or revisits a previous decision, the result is the same.
Congress is granted discretion but only within Court-imposed con-
straints. Thus, the Court would still maintain its role as the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution.
The ability to revisit Supreme Court interpretations rests upon
the reasoning employed in Chevron. Explicit in the Court's Chevron
decision is the recognition that interpretations under a statute may
need to shift in order to adjust to changing times."' Implicitly, the
decision thus grants to agencies the power to adopt constructions that
depart from prior judicial constructions, so long as the departure is
"7 One can easily imagine Congress reversing a 5-4 decision this way—by tacking on
an adoption of the dissenters' rationale to a statute (or as a stand-alone bill). It seems
difficult to imagine how the members of the Court would be able to characterize their
dissenting colleagues as "unreasonable," particularly if there is agreement among the dis-
senters (rather than a splintering of views).
148 See 467 U.S. at 863-64.
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reasonably within the meaning of the statute. 149 In applying the Chev-
ron rationale to congressional interpretive power, the same considera-
tions hold. if Congress could adopt a different interpretation than the
Court before the Court rules on a case and have it upheld by the
Court, there is no principled reason why Congress could not do the
same after a judicial decision. 15° It is this exercise of the interpretive
power that would require the Court to revisit the issue of a statute's
constitutionality.
Significantly, this procedure would not require any alteration of
the "Rule of Five," in the sense that five Justices could still declare that
a statute failed both prongs of the Chevron test. This result would sim-
ply be more unlikely, however, if one accepts the background assump-
tions of ambiguity in the constitutional text and intellectual honesty
on the Court. The truth of the former poses no problem for the pro-
posed method because it would be dealt with under the first stage of
the adapted Chevron test. As for the latter, it would appear much
harder for a Court whose legitimacy rests on the reasoned justification
of its opinions to hide behind its "non-political" role when the inter-
pretive question is posed in terms of reasonableness. Where reason-
able arguments for both positions exist, the Court in Chevron ac-
knowledged that judicial choice is more appropriately viewed as the
exercise of political choice by the unelected, rather than the explica-
tion of law. 151
The proposed method thus should test where the rubber meets
the road—can members of the Court put aside their own personal
predilections to answer the second question honestly? Undoubtedly
the answer is yes, but such an important question should be openly
confronted rather than exist as a mere academic hypothetical. Finally,
it would allow a principled method of determining when the Court
extends beyond "judgment" into "will" by examining the logical con-
sistency of the Court in a given area—where a result is inconsistent
with the Court's stated rationale, the odds are good that politics is
driving the decision.
Before examining some of the most salient arguments for and
against this proposed method, it will be helpful to see how this pro-
posal works when applied to actual cases. For these purposes, Roe v.
'" See id. at 843 n.1 1 (recognizing agency interpretation not necessarily what judiciary
would decide as matter of first impression).
150 Cf. id. at 844 ("(Al court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory pro-
vision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
151 See id. at 865-66.
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Wade and City of Boerne are ideal: they represent contentious issues
where disagreement appears endemic. These cases will not only allow
an exploration of the descriptive and normative components of the
methodology, but it is hoped that these examples also will show how
the methodology may facilitate dialogue by distinguishing between
reasonable and "best" interpretations, as well as inconsistent applica-
tion of any particular interpretation. 152
III. APPLYING THE METHOD TO ROE V. WADE AND CITY OF BOERNE
Roe v. Wade represents one of the most divisive issues in our soci-
ety today. Abortion cases have been an important backdrop to our
political discourse. They dictate Supreme Court appointments, pro-
voke mass political movements and present a recurring sight on the
Court's docket.'" Roe also has resulted in congressional challenges to
the Supreme Court's authority. 154 For present purposes, Roe is useful
because it puts in stark contrast the differing relationship between
state and congressional interpretations under this proposal, while
showing how the proposal might work. Roe also exhibits how the pro-
posed methodology, with its implicit requirement of logical consis-
tency by the Court, allows one to detect when the Court oversteps its
judicial bounds and suggest curative steps—all while remaining ag-
nostic between the combatants in the abortion debate. 155 City of
Boerne, on the other hand, represents a crystallized moment of
conflict between the legislative and judicial branches. 156 Application
of the proposed methodology to City of Boerne can reconcile it with the
strongest precedent against it, and provide insight into how the pro-
posed methodology would work in practice.
Roe v. Wade, decided in 1973, held unconstitutional a state statute
criminalizing abortions. 157 In that case, a Texas woman challenged the
law as a violation of her due process rights. 158 The Court concluded
that a fetus was not a constitutional "person" under the Fourteenth
152 See infra notes 153-217 and accompanying text.
155 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,995 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)john G. Ferreira, Note, 10 I-IoFsTRA L. REV. 1269 (1982).
154 See Ferreira, supra note 153, at 1270-71 (describing Uhlman Life Bill attempting to
overturn Roe).
155 See infra notes 182-196 and accompanying text.
P6 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,512 (1997).
157 See 410 U.S. 113,165 (1973).
155 See id. at 129.
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Amendment. 159
 The Court's opinion also located a pregnant woman's
right to terminate the pregnancy within the context of the Court's
previous "right to privacy" cases. 16° The majority further concluded
that although the fetus was not a "person" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the state did have an important interest in protecting
the "potential life" as well as the mother's health. 161
In analyzing the relationship between privacy rights and the
state's rights to protect the mother and the fetus, the Court estab-
lished a trimester framework for evaluating abortion regulations. 162
During the first trimester, based on statistics indicating that abortion
was safer than carrying a pregnancy to term, the Court rejected regu-
lation of abortion. 163
 As the pregnancy entered the second trimester,
however, the Court determined that the state could regulate abortion,
but only so long as the regulations were intended to protect the preg-
nant woman's health. 1" Finally, according to the Court, the state's
interest in protecting potential life would outweigh the woman's pri-
vacy interest in the third trimester, so long as there was an exception
for situations where the woman's life and health were in jeopardy. 165
In recognizing a right to abortion, Roe invalidated the abortion
laws of states across the country and ignited a firestorm of criticism
and protest. 166
 By the early 1980s, opponents of the decision had
gathered enough political clout to make overturning Roe a national
issue. 167
 During this period, certain members of Congress argued that
rather than passing a constitutional amendment to reverse Roe, Con-
gress might accomplish the same end through enactment of a stat-
ute. 168
 While the proposed "Human Life" legislation—which would
have defined a "person" as beginning at conception—never passed,
this strategy of congressional interpretation of the Constitution would
reappear in the debate over the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA”) . 169
158 See id. at 156-58.
160 See id. at 153.
161 See id. at 162-63.
162 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
163 See id. at 164.
164 See id.
165 See id.




169 42 U.S.C. § 200066 et seq. (1994).
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For purposes of exploring the proposed methodology, Roe's cen-
tral importance lies in its direct analysis of the text of the Constitu-
tion: the Court's interpretation of the word "person" under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 170 It is important to note that this construction
replaced a state interpretation of the key constitutional terms. Under
the proposed methodology, this is only proper because the Constitu-
tion should depend upon interpretation by federal actors, not
states171—congressibnal interpretation would thus not shift this im-
portant balance. 172 One must thus turn to the word "person" in the
Fourteenth Amendment.
It seems clear that the word cannot be applied before concep-
tion, for before then there is not a genetically distinct individual thing
upon which to attach concepts of personhood.173 Additionally, the
Fourteenth Amendment defines citizens based upon birth, setting
that as the latest point at which a fetus could be considered a "per-
son." 174 Between conception and birth there are, at least, three other
points that appear to reasonably demarcate the line between "person"
and "non-person": the initiation of heartbeat, 175 the beginning of
brainwave activity176 and viability. 177 Faced with these potential choices
170 See 410 U.S. at 158.
171 As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "1 do not think the United States would come
to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. 1 do think the Union
would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several
states." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (Harold j. Laski ed.,
1952)
172 This is analogous to the comity reflected in Supreme Court deference to state court
constructions of state law and constitutions. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938). This is reinforced by the multiplicity of potential state interpretations of a
single text. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 309, 348 (1816).
175 The justification for this point is fairly straightforward. The egg and sperm cells are
live cells. See Michael J. Flower, Corning into Being: The Prenatal Development of Humans
ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW 437, 438-42 a. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert
eds., 1992) (noting that it may be difficult to pin down the exact point during the fertiliza-
tion process that those cells unite to become a "person").
174 See U.S. CoNs-r. amend. XIV.
175 This point seems reasonable because the cessation of the heart is one criteria for
determining death. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1970 & Sum.
2001).
176 This is based on another criteria for determining death. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7181 (West 1970 & Stipp. 2001).
1" The Court in Roe seemed implicitly to recognize this point in its trimester frame-
work. See Roe, 410 U.S. 164-65. The rationale is clear enough: if the child could survive on
its own, its individuality and humanity could be considered realized, thus allowing recogni-
tion as a 'person." See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846 (1992) (recognizing viability as point justifying regulation). But see also Flower,
supra note 171, at 441 fig. 2 (recognizing other important transition points).
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in Roe, the Court had to choose. Birth is among these rational choices
and the Court cannot be faulted for choosing that particular point. In
this sense, Roe was not erroneous as a matter of legal interpretation.
One consequence of the proposed methodology, however, is the
opportunity it offers for Congress to alter that line. Because the key
term, "person," is in the Fourteenth Amendment, whatever definition
is given to it must apply nationally. Congress could adopt a different
line, moving the line to viability or some other, earlier point)" If this
were done, the differing application of laws regulating the intentional
taking of a life depending upon birth would appear vulnerable to an
equal protection challenge. 179 Should Congress pass a law construing
"person" in such a fashion, under this proposal Supreme Court accep-
tance appears almost certain. 18° Clearly, such a position might lead to
restrictions on the right to abortion, but a single switched vote on the
Court would leave the country in the same position. 181
At the same time, because the proposed methodology shifts the
normative focus away from policy concerns, one can examine the
logical consistency of opinions to discover a strong indication of im-
proper political concerns. This process is value-independent in the
sense that it depends not on the commentator's policy commitments,
but rather on the interpretive and value judgments already made by
the Court. A brief sketch shows how one might criticize the Court's
current approach based on its own reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Roe, but reaching a result at the other end of the po-
litical spectrum from the potentially "conservative" positions de-
scribed above that congressional interpretation would make avail-
able. 182 With Roe, the Court's interpretation of "person" has ram-
178
 Although there is an argument that the Court in Roe did precisely that in its recog-
nition of the state ability to ban most abortions post-viability. See 410 U.S. at 164-65.
"9 See id. at 157 n.54 (recognizing equal protection dilemma).
180 One might imagine states that define personhood more broadly than Congress (or
the Court). Assuming for the moment that this extended definition would not immedi-
ately violate the Constitution, there may be other ramifications that will be explored soon
within the context of the Supreme Court's current understanding of **person." See infra
notes 182-196 and accompanying text.
181
 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
182 The contention here is that by attempting to remove the more outright political
considerations from the judicial process, the Justices are left with choosing among the
various constructions. They may surely consider what the ramifications of choosing one
over another are in settling upon one construction. What should be singled out, however,
is the attempt to water down, based on policy rather than legal justifications, the construc-
tion they have adopted to avoid unpleasant results, rather than accepting the ramifications
of the construction they have adopted or outright switching to another option.
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ifications that cast serious doubt on part of the Court's trimester ra-
tionale and the continued invocation of the "undue burden" test
enunciated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 183
Applying thiS principle of analytic consistency to try and ferret
out when politics, divorced from reasonable interpretations of the
constitutional text, is at work, two problems with Roe stand out. First,
the legal classification of the fetus, left open by Roe, is troubling. At
first glance it would appear that the lack of personhood leaves the fe-
tus as property. 184 The Supreme Court has never so held, however,
and appears to treat the fetus as a sui generis category. 188 If the Court
has actually carved out a unique legal category, one would hope for a
rationale and maybe an explanation of what a fetus is legally, as op-
posed to what it is not. 186 The Court has not, however, seen fit to pro-
vide either despite almost thirty years of abortion litigation.
The second, more problematic, aspect of Roe is related to the le-
gal status of the fetus, but focuses on a woman's relationship to her
body, a fetus and the law. Assume every mother has a clear liberty in-
terest, if not also a property interest, 187 in her own body. 188 Because
the fetus is not legally a person, nor even alive, 189 it would appear that
any regulation of abortion not aimed at protecting the health of the
183 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (replacing Roe trimester framework with requirement that
abortion regulations not constitute an "undue burden" on woman's right to abortion).
184 Cf. BLACK'S LAW I)ICTIONARY 1216, 1479 (6th ed. 1991) (properly as "that which
belongs to one," things "as property contradistinguished from 'persons'").
185 Cf. Witty v. American General Capital Distributors, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex.
1987) (holding fetus neither "person" nor "property"); Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagina-
tion: The Moral and Legal Status of Fetuses and Embryos, 4 DEPAtn. J. or HEALTH CARE L. 703,
785 (1999) (arguing that the fetus occupies a  'que status, but comparable to "steward-
ship" of animals).
186 See William E. Buelow Ill, Comment, 7b Be and Not to Be: Inconsistencies in the Law Re-
garding the Legal Status of the Unborn Fetus, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 963, 965 (1998) (arguing pre-
sent status is "absolutely inconsistent"). The conundrum posed by the current, unex-
plained role of the fetus is adequately summed up in one Texas court's observation:
"Strangely, Texas law denies the mother and father of a viable human fetus capable of liv-
ing outside the womb at the time of the negligent tort, the redress of a statutory wrongful
death suit or survival claim for loss of the viable fetus, while at the same time Texas law
classifies unborn animals as "goods," so humans who own pregnant animals will have re-
dress for the negligently inflicted death of their unborn animals." Parvin v. Dean, 7 S.W.3d
264, 275-76 (Tex. App. Ct. 1999).
187 It is at least unclear if bodily parts are legally-cognizable property, see Moore v. Re-
gents, 793 P. 2d 479, 488-89 (Cal. 1990) (finding patient's cells not property apt removal
from body), but the fetus is arguably distinct from the mother, see Flower, supra note 173.
188 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) ("One aspect of
this liberty is a right to bodily integrity, a right to control one's person." ).
189 This directly follows from the Roe Court's observation that the state's interest is in
"poterdia/ life" as opposed to existent life. See 410 U.S. at 162-63.
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mother results in the usage of the woman's body for the benefit of the
state. 1" This is an infringement of her liberty interest—and therefore
requires due process191—and, arguably, a taking of her property. 192
The state cannot properly invoke a protection rationale because, le-
gally, there is no one to protect. 1"
The effect of such an understanding would be, at a minimum, to
greatly restrict the availability of such regulations,'" or even to re-
quire the state to subsidize, during pregnancy, the children that its
policies are requiring to be born. 195
 A strong argument thus exists
that every woman that carries a child to term should—if the Court
were to accept these implications of its opinions—have a claim against
the state once her pregnancy reaches the point at which the state
steps in to prevent abortion)" Conceding the brief nature of the
treatment of the above argument, it does reveal a great structural
weakness in Roe and its progeny—where did the Court find the link
between potential fetal life and a state's compelling interest? Even ac-
cepting this link, why must a state pay for a constitutional taking when
a plane flies over someone's home but not when a woman is forced to
carry a child to term? 197
 This failure of the Roe Court to reach the
conclusions that appear to follow from its legitimately chosen inter-
1" Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)
("Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights to possess, use and
dispose of it.'").
191 See U.S. CONST, amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law."). This due process requirement is applicable against
Congress and also against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
192 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("(NJor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."). This requirement is not only applicable to the states, it can
be invoked for interim damages for a "temporary taking." See First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987) ("It is axiomatic that
the Fifth Amendment's just compensation provision is designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice should
be borne by the public as a whole.") (internal quotations omitted).
195 Again, under Roe and its progeny, there is no life, only "potential life." See Roe, 410
U.S. at 162-63.
194 Cf. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-165 (striking down most pre-viability regulations because
state interest insufficient).
195 Cf. First Lutheran, 482 U.S. at 318-19 (requiring interim damages for a temporary
taking by state).
1" Cf. id. at 314-16 (recognizing reasons for interim compensation).
197 See United States v Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-68 (1946) (possible Fifth Amendment
taking when planes constantly fly over house); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d
100, 103 (Or. 1962) (nuisance easement constitutes taking even though planes do not fly
directly overhead).
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pretation, or even to discuss them, thus serves as a strong indication
that the Court is crossing the line into illegitimate political choice
rather than principled constitutional interpretation. 199
The proposed methodology thus allows abortion foes the oppor-
tunity to take their case that abortion constitutes the murder of hu-
man beings to the people. 199 If they are correct in their contention,
the issue takes on a different hue than if it is solely about reproductive
freedom.20° Recognition of the fetus as a "person" creates some seri-
ous conflicts between laws dealing with abortion, the intentional kill-
ing of "persons" and the Equal Protection Clause."' This does not
make the case, rather it only recognizes that these activists have pow-
erful, emotive arguments that the Supreme Court has not adequately
confronted. 202
At the same time, the proposed methodology also may be used to
criticize the Court's attempts to reach a political compromise on the
issue by denying women some of the very rights that Roe purported to
protect. By recognizing the due process and takings concerns left
aside in Roe, even though they appear incompatible with its holding, it
makes it possible to, identify where Roe went wrong with its own inter-
nal logic." Forcing the Court to confront these issues could bring the
sexual equity issues inherent in the abortion debate to the forefront.
If we deem the fetus is a "thing" and not a person, acknowledging that
198 If we object to the possible commodification of the birth process, there is at least
one response available, even if untried—the Court should state precisely what the legal
status of the fenis is—if not a "person," then it should state why it is not "property." Moreo-
ver, it should explain how a constitutional right (a woman's privacy right) can ever be out-
weighed by a statutory/political right (the state's interest in protecting the "potential
life").
99 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 7 (1992) (stat-
ing only political campaign available to advocates was to transform the federal judiciary).
200 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 ("If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appel-
lant's case, of course, collapses . . . .") (emphasis added).
291 See id.; see also id. at 157 n.54 (recognizing possible equal protection problems with
lesser punishments for abortions than other criminal offenses).
202 Nor does this realization necessarily detract from possible objections based on
equal protection grounds (if women were solely targeted by any implementation of the
view) or grapple with arguments that some level of disparate treatment between the born
and unborn may be rational and/or constitutional. Rather, it should help people of good-
will move forward in understanding and resolving this thorny issue.
20 Again, the Court might be able to clarify its position by explaining precisely what
the iegai status of a fetus is, If the Court is going to snake this a sui generis category, neither
person nor property, the Court should at least lay out a reasoned justification for the
choice. See supra note 184-186 and accompanying text; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (rec-
ognizing state 's interest in protecting fetus, but no mention of fetal "interests" or fetal legal
status).
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society's abortion laws may be taking from women control over their
bodies and property without paying the price or following proper
procedures—if any procedure could ever be "proper"—could
significantly alter or clarify the current terms of the debate.
What an acceptable price might be should be a matter of open
debate and exploration, rather than a relic of stereotypes or unspo-
ken assumptions. Either choice would move our national dialogue on
the issue and its related strands forward, rather than locking it into its
current, stagnant form. 204
 Seen in this dual fashion—as setting the
range of discourse and also allowing normative evaluation of Supreme
Court decisions without endorsing any particular outcome—the pro-
posed methodology could serve to unify our constitutional discourse
while also enriching it. Additionally, it shows how the methodology
can allow meaningful dialogue between disagreeing viewpoints by fo-
cusing on reasonability and the consistency of an interpretation and
its application. Once we define the sphere of reasonable interpreta-
tions, the pros and cons of both can be outlined and then the discus-
sion becomes more appropriately political, rather than legal.
Just as the proposed method may have wide ramifications for Roe,
so too does it have significant import for City of Boerne. 205 In 1990, in
Employment Divison v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that a state's de-
nial of unemployment benefits to a worker fired for the illegal use of
peyote did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment. 206
 Despite the centrality of peyote use to the worker's religion,
because the law was neutrally applied to members and non-members
of the Native American Church alike it was held consistent with the
First Aanendment. 2°7
 The Supreme Court reasoned that a neutral law
did not constitutionally require a balancing test where the asserted
state interest has to be compelling before a law could be applied to
religious followers. 2°8
Drawing upon its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce the protections found in the Bill of Rights, Congress passed
legislation aimed at mandating the balancing test rejected by the
Court in Smith.209
 The Supreme Court invalidated this legislation in
204 See TRIISE, ASORTOON, supra note 199, at 7 (recognizing impasse between various in-
terests in the abortion debate).
295
 521 U.S. at 507.
206
 494 U.S. at 890.
207
 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-13.
208 See id.
209 See id. at 515-16.
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City of Boerne. 21° Although conceding that Congress had some power
to enact prophylactic rules under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court held that there must be a showing that such rules were
needed.211 In this case, Congress had not established any need for the
rule, thus putting it beyond congressional power. 212
The invalidation of the RFRA appears to have largely circum-
scribed, if not altogether extinguished, the power of Congress to offer
greater protection of rights than the Court itself recognizes. 215 Apply-
ing the proposed methodology, Boerne is nonetheless a "correct" in-
terpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the sense that its reli-
ance on precedent and policy plausibly ties into the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment.214 This interpretation is only one of several
plausible interpretations, however, as a cogent argument can be made
that the very purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to grant
wide power to Congress to enforce its vision of the Bill of Rights pro-
tections against the states.215 Using the proposed methodology Con-
gress could reasonably adopt the more expansive view of the Amend-
ment and overrule the decision.
Significantly, the Court did not address the broad second-order
question of constitutional interpretation, regarding whether or not
Congress has constitutional interpretive power. Rather, it rejected
such power only as it applies to the Fourteenth Amendment under
the Court's own reading of the Amendinent. 2" Implicit in the opin-
ion, however, is the Court's apparent hostility towards such arguments
of a more expansive congressional role. 217 The very purpose of the
proposed method, however, is to lay out the arguments, based primar-
ily on precedent as well as policy, that might convince the Court oth-
erwise, thereby opening the way for a reconsideration of this deci-
sion.218 Moreover, if Congress were to claim the broad interpretive
210 See id. at 536.
211 See id. at 530-35.
212 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
213 See id. at 529 (describing dangers of congressional substantive interpretation of the
Constitution's provisions).
214 See id. at 520-29.
215 SeeAman, supra note 9, at 163-74.
216 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
Si? See id. at 529.
218 One hint that such an approach might be worthwhile lies in justice Scalia's recent
book. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 1 36 (1997). Justice Scalia im-
plies that, if the Constitution is more ambiguous by virtue of its aspirational qualities than
he apparently believes it is, judicial review may be inappropriate. See id. This proposed
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power outlined above, that combined with the 5-4 decision in Boerne
as to the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would require the
Court reach a different conclusion under the proposed methodology.
These applications of the proposed methodology pave the way for an
assessment of the strengths and some of the strongest potential criti-
cisms of the method.
IV. REASONS FOR AND AGAINST THE PROPOSED METHOD
If one were to analyze judicial decisions in an economic fashion,
one might focus on the error cost associated with these decisions. 219
Theoretically, one would inquire into the likelihood that a court
would be wrong and the effect of these errors. 220 One difficulty in do-
ing so, however, is reducing the consequences of legal error to a sin-
gle measure, which would allow comparison between individual deci-
sions and interpretive theories in an attempt to rationally minimize
error costs. 221 Assuming such a metrical approach to error costs is
difficult—if not impossible—to do, 222 it is still possible to get a rough
idea of the ramifications if the criticisms of Roe and Boerne mentioned
earlier are correct, whatever their ideological stripe. 223 Judicial review,
as it is currently practiced, can lead to tragic mistakes on a massive,
national level and can stunt our level of political discourse. 224 In con-
trast, it is enough to briefly touch on some key benefits of the pro-
posed method, as revealed in the Roe and Boerne examples.
The first benefit of the approach is the flexibility it restores to
our constitutional system.225 While the Constitution is unchanging, it
is meant to survive in changing times. 226 As Cass Sunstein and Michael
method attempts to reconcile ambiguity with judicial review rather than deny an important
role for either.
219 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 18. ("Error costs are the costs of mistaken judgments
as they effect the social and legal system as a whole.").
22° See id.
221 See id. at 19.
222 See id.
223 See supra notes 153-218 and accompanying text.
224 These ideas are broached in the attacks on maintaining only minimal judicial re-
view found in some of the works by Akhil Reed Amar, Alan Hirsch and Mark Tushnet. See
generally AMAR SC HIRSCH, supra note 24; TUSHNET, supra note 134.
225 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 134, at 177-82 (defending a more flexible constitu-
tional vision).
226 See supra note l27 and accompanying text. Further support lies in the realization
that Chief justice Marshall's words about the "constitution we are expounding" in McCul-
loch V, Maryland, 107 U.S, (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1816), were raised to support allowing con-
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Dorf have recently noted, the pace of change and the needs of the
country simply outstrip the ability of the courts, and particularly the
Supreme Court, to respond adequately. 227 Both rely on the increased
pace of change in support of these arguments,228 but an even greater
argument for flexibility rests in the Court's own history. 229
The need for flexibility can be seen in the case of Dred Scott v.
Sanford, where the Court declared a federal statute unconstitutional
for only the second time in its history. 23° Beyond deciding the case at
hand, the Court reached out to try and solve a national issue by de-
claring unconstitutional the Missouri Compromise of 1850, which
moderated the sectional tensions over slavery. 231 Instead of accom-
plishing its intended result, the Court hastened, and perhaps made
inevitable the bloodiest conflict in United States history. 232 Assuming
that one agrees the decision was, or at the very least, could have been
wrong, the Supreme Court only grades out at 50% over the course of
the first sixty years of judicial review.233 Again and again, the results of
judicial "mistakes" have dramatic impacts upon the United States.234
Beyond these mistakes, the Court's history of politically-
influenced decisions argues against a static and non-political view of
its role. 233 In the 1937 cases of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. and
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, the Supreme Court significantly reversed
course in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence following the Presi-
gressional discretion. See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW:
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 41 (1986).
211 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 100; Dorf, ,supra note 16, at 8.
222 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 18 (using Internet as example of rapid change);
Dorf, supra note 16, at 8.
22° See infra notes 230-244 and accompanying text.
23° See 60 U.S. (19 flow.) 393,452 (1856).
231 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 49.
232 See id.
233 For a characterization of the decision as a mistake, see Sunstein, supra note 16, at
49. In order to arrive at the 50% figure, compare Mal-bury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (as-
sliming correct) with Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452 (assuming incorrect).
234 If the over one million de.ad and wounded do not stand as sufficient indictment of
the dangers attached to judicial inflexibility, one need only look to the Great Depression
for another poignant example. See 4 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 681 (1983)
(Civil War casualties). It is almost a truism that the active exercise of the judicial veto of
federal statutes during the early Depression was erroneous, See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CoNsTiTuTioN 45 (1993). In 1937, when the Court began sustaining similar stat-
utes and overruling prior decisions, the Court effectively admitted as much. See id. The
previously invalidated programs may well have worked. At the very least, they deserve the
benefit of the doubt. How many families that might have been helped had to suffer be-
cause of a constitutional mistake?
2'5 See, e.g., infiu MACS 236-239 and accompanying text.
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dent's court-packing plan. 236
 The "switch in time that saved nine" is an
episode that underscores the interaction between flexibility and po-
litical choice that already exists on the Court. 237
 Not only did the
Court take a new interpretive path; it appeared to do so in direct re-
sponse to political pressure.238
 One need not be a complete cynic to
observe that the history of the Court's economic decisions at this time
might be more adequately explained by observation of presidential
appointments during the period rather than a focus on the legal
justifications advanced. 239
 This politically adaptive behavior by the
Court underscores another benefit of the proposed method.
By its very nature, Congress is more capable of responding to
changing conditions than the judiciary because of its ties to the
American electorate and independent fact-gathering abilities. 240 Al-
though this is no guarantee that congressional policies will be "good,"
the process of election should minimize policies that are too "bad. "241
Moreover, it is unclear that the Court is any more "good" than Con-
gress. Defenders of current Court practice might point to the Court's
decision in Bolling v. Sharpe, invalidating educational segregation in
the District of Columbia, as an example of saving Congress from its
own impulses. 242
 The revealing contrarian story focuses on the history
of conflict between a civil-rights enforcing Congress and the judiciary
that marked the early post-Amendment years, including the Court's
attempts to restrict and defang the Fourteenth Ainendment. 243
 It is at
236
 See NLRB, 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937); West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937); see
aLso United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-16 (1941) (overruling key economic due
process case).
237 See Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 620
(1994).
238
 See id. at 621-23.
239 See id.
24° Cf. TUSIINET, supra note 134, at 65-71 (examining objections to congressional con-
stitutional interpretation and concluding that "skeptical rejection of populist constitu-
tional law . . . is powerfully antidemocratic.").
241 see, Q. tie.g.,ruvulli a AIRSCH, supra note 24, at 28 (defending constitutional plebiscites
against mistakes because of flexibility to repeal).
242 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
243
 Consider the following cases: The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883), which re-
stricted Congressional power to enforce civil rights to state action, while The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1872), effectively eliminated the reach of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause. One of the earliest Dormant
Commerce Clause cases, Hall v. Decider, 95 U.S. 485, 487-88 (1877), struck down a state
desegregation law for common carriers within the state, while the Supreme Court upheld 1;
a nearly identical law mandating segregation in Louisville, N.O. Co' T Ry. Co. v. Mississippi,
l33 U.S. 587, 594 (1890) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ('The Mississippi statute, in its applica-
tion to passengers on railroad trains employed in interstate commerce, requires
	 sepa-
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best unclear that judicially-crafted doctrines, whether the Warren
Court's expansion of civil rights or the ninety years of judicially-
sanctioned Jim Crow laws, are an improvement over the vagaries of
Congress. 244
Facilitating flexibility is thus an attempt to minimize the effect of
judicial error and ensure that political decisions are indeed made by
politically responsive branches, while leaving the judiciary with a lim-
ited, but important, role. 245 Additionally, although the potential in-
crease in change may impact reliance interests, 246 this effect is coun-
terbalanced in many ways by the prospective nature of legislation
compared to the retroactive application when the Court overrules its
precedents;247 it supplies people with greater notice of the Constitu-
tion's meaning as enforceable law. This clarifying effect for the public
will be particularly pronounced if Congress begins to add interpretive
sections to legislation before the Court even addresses a statute.
Tied to these democratic concerns with flexibility is the relative
ease with which change could then be effected under the proposed
methodology, as opposed to the difficulty inherent in requiring the
people to go through the amendment process every time the Court
makes a mistake.248 The disconnect between the Court and the people
makes the Court more difficult for the American public to monitor
than Congress,249 and the difficulty of the amendment process stands
as a significant hurdle to political organization for all except the most
ration of races, while those trains are within that state. I am unable to perceive how [Hall v.
Decuid is a regulation of interstate commerce, and [this] is not.").
244 Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (expanding Fourteenth
Amendment protections), with supra note 243 and accompanying text (Supreme Court .
arguably reducing Fourteenth Amendment protections).
245 In this same vein, see Sunstein, supra note 16, at 18; Dorf, supra note 16, at 51; see
generally also jouN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing for limited Su-
preme Court role).
246 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (explaining significance
of reliance interests to stare decisis considerations dealing with prior constitutional deci-
sions).
247 See SCALIA, supra note 218, at 10-11.
248 SeeAMAR HIRSCII, supra note 24, at 5.
"9 Regardless of the empirical ability of citizens to track their congressional members
or Court decisions, Court members are substantially removed from the political process.
This follows from the insulation granted by the Constitution to the judiciary with life ten-
ure. See U.S. CONSI. art. Ill. But see also TERM JENNINGS PEREYFI, IN 1)ErENstt OF A POLITI-
CAL CouRT 185 (1999) (noting public lack of knowledge of and affect toward Supreme
Court).
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popular propositions.25° Once one acknowledges the ambiguity in
many of the Constitution's provisions, requiring an amendment to fix
each interpretation seems to be a requirement disproportionate to
the offense. 251
 After all, judicial decisions are below the Constitution,
not equivalent to it. 252
 This concern is particularly valid if one accepts
the argument that the amendment process can be short-circuited by
the Court's asserted power to then interpret that constitutional provi-
sion.253
Beyond these concerns with flexibility lie other democratic con-
siderations. Congressional interpretation, under the proposed
method, would put the words of the Constitution squarely on the ta-
ble of the American electorate. 254
 The reinjection of the Constitution
into our political discourse would thus serve to reinvigorate politics in
such areas as abortion and religious freedom. 255
 In so doing, congres-
sional interpretation will raise the stakes surrounding elections and
the oversight of Congress, thus encouraging greater participation. 256
Additionally, congressional interpretation ties the Constitution to the
very audience at whom its written form was directed, the American
public.257
 At the same time, the limitations on congressional interpre-
tation serve to minimize the chances that an impassioned majority will
tread on the Constitution unchecked. 258
Additionally, the proposed method is compatible with current
practice. Given the Court's comfort level with incremental change,
this can be seen as simply another step in the unfolding explication of
judicial review, statutory interpretation and the political question doc-
250 See U.S. CONST. art. V (amendment process requirements); see also AMAR & HIRSCH,
supra note 24, at 5 (making reference to agency problems in enacting amendments).
25 ' See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 59 (1949).
252 See Fisher & Devins, supra note 123, at 13 (describing Meese view). This observation
is being used in the most basic sense, to simply restate the Supremacy Clause of the Consti-
tution in a different form.
255 See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 9, at 23-24; see also Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (placing restrictive interpretation on terms of Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
254
 For other works adopting a similar perspective, see generally AMAR & HIRSCH, supra
note 24; TUSHNET, supra note 134.
255 See generally AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 24.
256 Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 134, at 174 (stressing important values in spreading consti-
tutional responsibility throughout population).
257 Cf. James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments with Notes
for the Amendments Speech in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 5 l , 58 (Randy E. Bar-
nett ecl., 1989) (aimed at general public).
258 See Id. at 60-61 (role of justice tribunals in preventing constitutional violations).
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trine. 259 It is a step anticipated by Chevron and requires no revolution-
ary alterations in the working of the Court or its precedents. 26°
Moreover, this method fits well with current practices in recognizing
an important role for congressional interpretation, but avoiding a
grant of interpretive power equivalent to Congress's ability to com-
pletely rewrite statutes. 261
Not only is the proposal compatible with current practice, but it
would also allow the Court to clarify some problematic doctrines. By
shifting some of the onus for interpretive change onto Congress, this
method could justify a stronger form of stare decisis. 262 Conversely, its
acknowledgment of the policy grounds underlying many Supreme
Court decisions and the power of Congress to correct "mistaken"
policies may justify a more activist Court less beholden to stare deci-
sis. 263 Although the method is agnostic between a strong or weak ver-
sion of stare decisis, it gives a clear rationale for either choice. 264 The
major limitation on the above observation is the immovable weight
given unanimous opinions. 265 This caveat creates a principled
justification for the application of stare decisis to unanimous deci-
sions—without regard to the decision's substance—while leaving
room for prudential arguments about stare decisis in other contexts.
The proposed method would also eliminate the need for a sepa-
rate "political question" doctrine. 266 Despite the Court's efforts to ra-
tionalize the "political question" doctrine, it still has a certain ad hoc
air to it. 267 Not only is it unclear when it applies, but it appears to
cover too much. 266 As the concurring Justices pointed out in Nixon,
the doctrine's complete exemption of issues from judicial oversight
seems excessive. 269 For instance, one rightly may ask whether it would
make sense in a case like Powell to come to a different conclusion be-
cause Congress had, by majority vote, concluded that Powell was six-
259 See Dorf, supra note 16, at 7—S (noting that Supreme Court uses common law,
common law is incremental).
26° See supra notes 112-138 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 112-138 and accompanying text.
262 See.supra notes 240-254 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 240-254 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 240-254 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
267 See, e.g., Baker Y. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,209-37 (1961).
268 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,239 (1993) (White, J., concurring); id.
at 253-54 (Sourer, J., concurring); r CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, Stipill note 9, at 22—
28.
269 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 239 (White, J., concurring).
384	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:349
teen years old in order to circumvent review?270
 Instead of completely
insulating certain constitutional areas from judicial review in order to
avoid making policy, the proposed method would afford the Court a
means of addressing political issues without eliminating the power of
the elected branches to make political decisions. 271
 As a description of
what the Court is actually doing in these cases, the proposed method
has a close fit.272
Finally, as a matter of judicial policy, the proposed method is su-
perior to current practice. A truism of the legal profession is that
judges depend upon a factual context in order to render decisions. 2"
A corollary to this is the susceptibility of important policies to rising
or falling based on the context within which they are presented to the
judiciary as demonstrated by activist legal organizations that strive to
create the proper "test cases" that may distort the working of stat-
utes. 274
 Rather than hold policy hostage to these fact patterns, the
proposed method will help judges decide the initial case without an
overriding concern for the policy implications. It will then allow a
true dialogue between the judiciary and the rest of the federal gov-
ernment about the consequences of adopting one view or another. 275
To the extent that political issues are further withdrawn from the ex-
clusive province of the judiciary, it should increase the collegiality of
the profession and hopefully increase the uniformity of decisions,
while minimizing the role of party affiliation and nomination in pre-
dicting judicial outcomes. 276
 The continuing battle over Roe and judi-
cial nominations stands as a relatively good example of this party-
related proxy effect that the proposal seeks to avoid. 277
Up to this point, the argument has focused on the positive as-
pects of the proposal. Clearly, however, a challenge to the status quo
must anticipate the inevitable lines of criticism. Perhaps the most
270 Cpr id. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (noting Senate position that any arbitrary pro-
cedure or even no procedure was protected by the word "try" in Impeachment Clause.)
271 See supra notes 139-152 and accompanying text.
272 Cf. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209-37.
273 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 139, at 41-44.
274
 One can get a feel for the power of facts by reading Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(where Justice Blackmun states "Poor Joshua!").
275 Cf. PERETTI, supra note 247, at 59 (referring to constitutional dialogue). But see
Dorf, supra note 16, at 39-40 (arguing no real dialogues in current method).
276 See generally STEPHEN CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FED-
ERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994).
277 See id. at 80-81,154 (mentioning predictability of judicial appointees and its prob-
lematic role), 71-72 (role of ideology), 83 (specific instance with Roe).
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emotionally powerful objections to the proposed method center on
the possibility that Congress may, periodically or consistently, be less
protective of rights than the Supreme Court. 278 But is that really a
problem? First, we have the comfort of realizing that by restricting
interpretations to "reasonable" ones, the methodology should prevent
the grossest excesses that can be imagined.27° For instance, by the very
nature of its 9-0 result, Brown v. Board of Education survives all chal-
lenges to its authority, thus leaving that important decision un-
touched. 28° Second, such an objection assumes that there is no "zero-
sum" relationship between the various rights that are protected by the
Constitution.281 Such a "zero-sum" relationship exists where enhanc-
ing protection of one constitutional right translates into lower protec-
tion for another constitutional right. 282
It should be noted that the expansion of many rights may have
come at the expense of other rights. In fact, there is a plausible theory
that protection of certain economic rights by the pre-New Deal Court
effectively reduced the rights of others in the country.285 A similar ar-
gument that protection of one form of rights harms another is cur-
rently directed towards the Court's current jurisprudence regarding
campaign finance. 284 In recognizing individual spending as a form of
"speech," the argument goes, the Court is allowing the "voice" of
weaker economic players to be drowned out. 285 Conversely, a similar
argument has been made that property sights have not received
enough protection since the developments of the New Dea1. 286 While
there may be no easy solutions, or perhaps the Court has even hap-
pened upon the single best solution, it is at least unclear whether or
278 See TUSHIVET, supra note 134, at 55-56 (discussing similar concerns).
279 For a discussion of precedential value in a similar vein, if a different perspective,
see generally Rebecca Harmer White, The Stare Decisis Exception to the Chevron Deference
Rule, 44 FLA, L, REV. 723 (1992).
289 See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
281 See Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 1-IARv. L. REV. 1212, 1231 (1978).
282 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 234, at 57-62 (analyzing Court's economic cases dur-
ing Depression).
263 See id.
284 Seel Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obsta-
cle to Political Equality?, 82 Count. L. REV. 609, 639-41 (1982).
285 See id. at 640.
286 See Richard Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 5, 37-39 (1989).
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not society or the Court has struck the right balance between these
various competing claims. 287
Furthermore, there remains the very real possibility that the
Court will itself reverse its course. 288 Also, as the world changes
around us, the optimal balance might change.289
 It seems difficult to
reconcile these realities and Marshall's language in McCulloch v. Mary-
land about the "constitution we are expounding" with such a static or
teleological view of the Constitution's dictates. 29° Additionally, there
remains the American people to consider. Any belief that constitu-
tional "mistakes" will be left in place must maintain that the electorate
are either unable to provide enough oversight over Congress to rec-
ognize its mistakes as such, or are simply wrong about a particular is-
sue.291
 The first is a questionable empirical claim that threatens the
very justifications of democracy, and the second seems incompatible
with our ideals. 292
 One wonders whether such critics would classify
themselves as "wrong" if the Court were to change its position on any
issue in which they firmly believe. 293
In sum, the objection based on the risk of congressional errors
should apply equally to the Court and fits uncomfortably within our
democratic traditions and beliefs. Moreover, the proposed methodol-
ogy could co-exist with this sort of view—so long as one finds the
realm of "clear" rights under the methodology equivalent to the rights
that should be protected under an "enlightened" Supreme Court
view. For those claims of right and right-infringement that are most
contentious, one has difficulty imagining any other a priori way of de-
termining which claims are correct. Thus, the congressional mistake
argument loses much of its appeal in a democratic nation and does
not, standing alone, invalidate the proposed methodology.
Leaving aside the possible results that the proposed method
might reach, one might also argue the proposed methodology is fore-
closed by precedent. This Note has striven to show the proposed
method's compatibility with all of the Supreme Court's most impor-
27See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 30 (advocating minimalism where constitutionally
relevant moral uncertainty).
288
 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 944,966 (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting) (four justices would
overturn Roe).
289 See Dorf, supra note 16, at 5L
299
 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
292 Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 134, at 70-71.
292 See id.
293 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 30, at 737-38 (justifying advising someone else to fol-
low an interpretive strategy one personally would not follow).
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tant cases, from Marbury through Powell to Nixon, and with the possi-
ble exception of Boerne.294 The other potential historical stumbling
block one might imagine is the Eleventh Amendment. One view of
the Eleventh Amendment, which was enacted to overturn an early
Supreme Court decision, is that its passage provides implicit support
for the need to use the amendment process to alter judicial deci-
sions.295 The conclusion is reached precisely because constitutional
amendment rather than statutory amendment was the course Con-
gress took the first time it disagreed with a Supreme Court decision. 298
In response, two observations undermine the Eleventh Amendment's
support for such a proposition. The first is the fact that, based upon
its subject matter, the decision that provoked the Eleventh Amend-
ment could have easily been overturned by statute. 297 Additionally, the
political context of the time lends credence to the view that the Elev-
enth Amendment was reported by the Federalists as a political device
to preempt criticism by and support for pro-French elements of the
Democratic-Republican opposition. 298 When combined, these two ob-
servations undercut the historical, as opposed to rhetorical, precedent
of the Eleventh Amendment in arguing against the proposed method.
Another objection might center on the proposed method's effect
on stare decisis. As argued earlier, however, the proposed method is
ambivalent about judicial stare -decisis and congressional flexibility is
actually a benefit rather than a problem. 299 Stare decisis for its own sake
brings to mind Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous quote, "It is revolting
to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. " 900 Such stare decisis-based objections beg the
question in evaluating the proposed method, unless these concerns
are tied to specific results. In such cases, they should be dealt with in
terms of challenging the results the proposed method might reach,
not stare decisis.
Finally, perhaps the most serious objection to the proposed
method is that it could be unworkable. Changing the interpretation
of a constitutional clause has ramifications beyond any particular stat-
294
 See supra notes 59-104 and accompanying text.
"5 See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinter-
pretation, 83 COLUM. L. Etv.v. 1889,1895 (1983).
296 Levy, supra nole 126, at 59; EDWARD KEYNES & RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT VS.
CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING & ABORTION 153 (1989).
257 See Gibbons, supra note 295, at 1934-36.
298
 See id. at 1926-36.
299 See supra notes 230-265 and accompanying text.
5" See PLATT, supra note 132, at 126.
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ute. One can imagine laws that are valid under one interpretation and
invalid under another." 1
 It is also possible to imagine interpretations
of one clause conflicting with interpretations of another. 902 A realistic
solution to the first problem would be to consider the adoption of an
interpretation by Congress to be an implicit repeal of all incompatible
legislation. 383
 That way, one can avoid congressional adoption of
conflicting interpretations to save single pieces of legislation. 304
 Addi-
tionally, this "cascading" effect will likely reduce (perhaps after a bad
experience or two) the desire of Congress to make changes without
due regard for the consequences. 305 In the same way, the Court could
invalidate an interpretation that clashed with another clause, requir-
ing Congress to re-enact the legislation until it adequately meshed the
two clauses. Such an approach would have the benefits of increasing
awareness of the Constitution as a constitutive whole, rather than in-
dividual clauses, by all governmental actors.388 Through the prism of
Congress this effect should even reach to the people themselves. 307
The very scale of change would thus act as a channeling agent reduc-
ing the likelihood of constant change, but still allowing it whenever
circumstances or need made such a change desirable." 8
CONCLUSION
Rather than viewing congressional interpretation in the un-
bounded light suggested by congressional power to overturn judicial
statutory constructions, the Court should look to applying the Chevron
reconciliation of agency and judicial interpretive interests to the con-
stitutional realm. This Note has explored the ramifications such an
approach would have. Adopting the proposed method would not only
be consistent with precedent, but would also reinvigorate our political
3°1 Compare City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512 (striking down RFRA), with supra notes 216-
219 and accompanying text (arguing RFRA can be constitutional).
302 See David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us Pray (Bus Not "Them"!): The Troubled
Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. joHN's L. REV. 273,289 11.58. (1991).
3(13
 Such an approach might clear the books of currently unconstitutional law, effecting
a form of desuetude. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 16, at 69-70 (arguing judges should strike
down outdated laws and allow legislatures to reenact).
304
 See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
305 Cf. TUSHNET, supra note 134, at 57-65 (discussing effect of judicial overhang on
Congress).
3°6 See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 24, at xviii—xxi (arguing for benefits of rejecting
clause-bound approach to interpreting Constitution); AMAR, supra note 9, at xi—xiv (same).
307 See TusuNEr, supra note 134, at 177-94.
miSee generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); See also TUSH-
NET, sttpra noie 134, at 67.
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spheres—making the Constitution, truly a document of the people,
not just of judges. Such a turn should have positive ramifications for
the Supreme Court, for Congress, for our jurisprudence and for our
political lives. Even the mere possibility of provoking a true dialogue
between Congress and the courts would be a significant benefit. Addi-
tionally, the ability of the model to assimilate the diversity of view-
points that exist within our society should enhance its attractiveness to
the sides in the various conflicts that find their way into the court sys-
tem—thus making the proposal a practical, as well as theoretical pos-
sibility. All these considerations argue for the need to seriously ex-
pand the sources and understanding of constitutional interpretation,
and push for a flexible framework such as the one advanced in this
Note.
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